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R  E  V  I  S  T  A   D  E   E  S  T  U  D  I  O  S   I  N  T  E  R  N  A  C  I  O  N  A  L  E  S
INTRODUCTION
s a result of globalization, States
have realized that the attraction of
foreign investment into their terri-
tories is a decisive element in their eco-
nomic growth. States alone are not capa-
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The growing concern of States in order to attract foreign investment into their
territories has led to the formulation of a legal structure aimed at encouraging
investment through the granting of a secure and stable environment for the
investor in the host State. In the core of this structure is the Fair and Equitable
Treatment standard which, as a non – contingent standard, constitutes an
independent and reliable system for the protection of the investor. However,
the application of the true fairness concept underlying the standard seems at
times in jeopardy, due to a serious lack of precision regarding its true meaning.
Arbitrators and scholars have wandered from one interpretation to another,
trying in occasions to fit the standard in existing legal concepts such as the
international minimum standard of customary international law or simply
creating a whole new meaning by means of self-contained legal figure. The
article examines the latest and most decisive attempts to define the standard
within modern international law, all of which have contributed to a dynamic
but controversial discussion around the topic.
ble of generating sufficient economic ac-
tivity to sustain a steady growth in their
economy. This is true mainly among de-
veloping countries or capital-importing
countries.
There is concern among States as to
the method of stimulating these invest-
A
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ment flows into their countries. On the
other hand, the investor’s decision to
make an investment depends on a secure
and stable environment in the host State.
On this basis, States have agreed upon a
set of basic standards for the purpose of
granting the investor the security he ex-
pects and assuring its continuance over
time.
Classical standards such as national
treatment or non-discrimination have be-
come insufficient. The reason is based on
the concern of investors that because
those standards are contingent in nature,
the protection granted to them may not
reach their basic expectations as the treat-
ment provided by the State to its own na-
tionals –which is the basis of the latter
standards– is deficient. Thus, although
treated in a non-discriminatory way in re-
lation to the host State’s nationals, that
treatment violates basic rights that are
considered essential for an investment to
develop effectively. Therefore, the latter
protection is not only a concern of capi-
tal-importing countries, but also of capi-
tal-exporting countries that desire to pro-
tect their investors worldwide.
In order to grant non-contingent pro-
tection to the foreign investor, States have,
since the 1960’s, agreed on bilateral ini-
tiatives to assure this protection, consti-
tuting a worldwide network of investment
agreements. These agreements estab-
lished a set of standards to grant the for-
eign investor a safety net for his invest-
ment. Some of these standards of protec-
tion are the Most-Favored Nation, No
Expropriation without due compensation
and Fair and Equitable Treatment, the lat-
ter being the object of the present analy-
sis.
There is a worldwide net of bilateral
agreements for the protection of
the foreign investor.
The fair and equitable treatment stand-
ard has become the center of discussion in
various forums, and most of all among ar-
bitrators who have applied it. It constitutes
one of the most important elements avail-
able to a foreign investor to protect his in-
vestment in a foreign country because it
provides him with a certain treatment that
the host State must grant regardless of the
treatment given to its own nationals.
It is the discussion regarding the true
meaning of the standard that has become
a main focus in international investment
law. Although most investment agreements
grant this standard, they do not provide an
indication as to what its exact meaning is
and what the criterion is by which it must
be applied.
Developed countries have become
concerned about the real effect this pro-
tection will have on their nationals that in-
vest in capital-importing countries. Their
worry is based on the fact that the stand-
ard has been given many different inter-
pretations in arbitral cases (more prolifi-
cally within the scope of Nafta), which is
acknowledged in many studies, such as
those of the OECD. However, this is not
good news, considering that instead of
promoting stability and certainty among
investors, this situation produces exactly
the opposite effect.
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There have been, however, some ini-
tiatives from States to define the meaning
of the standard through an interpretation
of the agreements they have signed. Such
is the case of Nafta, where the Free Trade
Commission issued an interpretation
equating the standard to the minimum
standard of customary international law.
Although an important initiative, it did not
contribute to clarifying the meaning of the
standard and, moreover, lowered the pro-
tection granted to the investor.
THE SEARCH FOR A MEANING
The manner in which a treaty struc-
tures the standard and its association with
other standards will be decisive in defin-
ing its meaning.
The latter structure differs from one
treaty to another. And due to the vague-
ness of this structure, which provides no
enlightenment in resolving the true mean-
ing of the standard, different treaties and
investment agreements have evolved
throughout the years with the aim of hand-
ing over a greater set of tools for the pur-
pose of using this standard in a more uni-
form way. It is not clear whether the idea
of the parties is to completely elucidate
the standard’s definition. The fact is that
«The attempts to clarify the normative
content of the standard itself have, until
recently, been relatively few. There is a
view that the vagueness of the phrase is
intentional to give arbitrators the possibil-
ity to articulate the range of principles
necessary to achieve the treaty’s purpose
in particular disputes. However, a number
of governments seem to be concerned that
the less guidance is provided for arbitra-
tors, the more discretion is involved, and
the closer the process resembles decisions
ex aequo et bono,. i.e. based on the arbi-
trators notions of ‘fairness’ and ‘equity’1.
Some governments are concerned
that the less guidance provided for
arbitrators, the more dicretion is
involved.
Different formulations in different in-
vestment agreements and different inter-
pretations by arbitrators have led to a va-
riety of expressions in relation to its true
meaning, which ultimately do not contrib-
ute to a secure environment for invest-
ment.
Recent treaties, such as Nafta (par-
ticularly in light of the Free Trade Com-
mission’s interpretation that narrowed its
meaning) and the United States-Chile Free
Trade Agreement, have made important
progress in narrowing the scope of the
definition of its meaning in their investment
Chapters. Nonetheless, this latest ten-
dency has not sufficed for Tribunals to
develop a uniform jurisprudence on the
meaning of the term. Although Tribunals
increasingly rely on other Tribunals’ find-
ings, there are still important differences
in the approach.
1 ORCD, Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in Internacional Investment Law, 2004, p. 2.
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Of particular interest are the views of
investors with regard to the standard, as
well as that of host States. Investors gen-
erally argue the more expansive view, that
is, conceiving the standard as a self-con-
tained concept, which will extend far be-
yond the minimum standard approach that
limits it to outrageous behavior by the host
State, as was established in the Neer case2
in the 1920´s. On the other hand, the host
State’s argument will tend to limit its li-
ability precisely to the Neer case under-
standing.
The main approaches that have been
formulated regarding the meaning of the
standard are (i) equating it to the interna-
tional minimum standard that is present in
international customary law, (ii) measur-
ing it against international law, including
all sources; (iii) considering it as an inde-
pendent standard based on the plain-
meaning approach; or (iv) considering it
as an independent rule of customary in-
ternational law.
THE INTERNATIONAL MINIMUM
STANDARD APPROXIMATION:
A DOOR TO CUSTOMARY LAW
When States agree upon the fair and
equitable treatment standard and include
it in an investment agreement, they are
dealing with the fairness and equity con-
cept that is already present in their own
legal systems, which they view as a com-
mon standard. However, and for the pur-
pose of attaining the status of a common
standard at the level of international obli-
gations, an important deal of uniformity in
relation to its significance is decisive, which
will be achieved through the determina-
tion of its main elements.
States are dealing with the fairness
and equity concept already present
in their legal systems.
One of the main theories that exists
to define the Fair and Equitable Treatment
standard is the one that considers the
standard to be a part of the international
minimum standard required by interna-
tional law, which, for many States, is a part
of customary international law.
The latter conclusion derives from a
set of sources in which there is a capital-
exporting State perspective on the issue.
And although at the doctrinal level this is
an approximation on which there is im-
portant literature, it is salient to point out
that «it cannot readily be argued that most
States and investors believe fair and equi-
table treatment is implicitly the same as
the international minimum standard.»3
That is, at the empirical level there is not
a general acknowledgment of countries in
2 Neer Claim, United Nations, Reports of International Arbitral Awards, 1926, IV, p. 60. In OECD.
The International Minimum Standard in Customary International Law. Annex to Fair and Equitable
Treatment Standard in International Investment Law, OECD, 2004.
3 UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment. UNCTAD Series on issues in international investment
agreements. United Nations. Geneva. 1999. Volume III, p 13.
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relation to this approach, as we will es-
tablish.
The International Minimum Standard
The international minimum standard is
a rule of customary international law which
governs the treatment of aliens, by pro-
viding for a minimum set of principles
which States, regardless of their domes-
tic legislation and practices, must respect
when dealing with foreign nationals and
their property4. Moreover, «the interna-
tional minimum standard sets a number of
basic rights established by international
law that States must grant to aliens, inde-
pendent of the treatment accorded to their
own citizens»5.
The violation of this standard may
engender international responsibility for
the host State.
The international minimum standard is
related to the protection of foreign nation-
als or aliens in general, and has, due to the
remarkable growth in international invest-
ment instruments, mainly BIT’s, gained an
important representation in the area of in-
vestment.
This standard had been already rec-
ognized by Vattel in the 18th century and
was referred to during the 19th and 20th
centuries. The decisive ruling regarding
this standard was the Neer Claim,6 which
defined the type of treatment of an alien
that would constitute an international crime
(«outrage, bad faith, willful neglect of duty,
an insufficiency of governmental action so
far short of international standards that
every reasonable and impartial man would
readily recognize its insufficiency»).
The international minimun standard
is a rule of customary international
law that States must respect
when dealing with foreign nationals
and their property.
Since the 20th century, however, the
standard’s existence was challenged by
Latin American countries and other de-
veloping countries that asserted the rule
of national treatment instead. After World
War II, the significance of this standard
as an autonomous rule of customary in-
ternational law has persisted only to the
extent of the protection of foreign prop-
erty and investments (in its relationship to
the Fair and Equitable Treatment stand-
ard).
FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT. PART
OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW?
The relationship between the fair and
equitable treatment standard and the in-
ternational minimum standard of custom-
4 OECD, The International Minimum Standard in Customary International Law, Annex to Fair and
Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment Law, OECD, 2004, p. 26.
5 OECD, The International Minimum Standard in Customary International Law, p. 26.
6 Neer Claim, p. 60. In OECD, The International Minimum Standard in Customary International Law,
p. 27.
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ary international law has been regarded
by some investment agreements as tanta-
mount, i.e., as equivalent terminology. For
others, the standard is a part of the inter-
national minimum standard of customary
international law. However, and with the
exception of Nafta (through its Free Trade
Commission’s interpretation of the issue)
and those investment instruments that ex-
pressly equate the Fair and Equitable
Treatment standard to the international
minimum standard, such as the US and
UK BIT Model, « the vast majority of
those containing such clause (Fair and
Equitable), about 88 percent, make no
mention of international law in connection
with it … In my sample of that approxi-
mately 12 percent that mentions interna-
tional law in connection with fair and eq-
uitable treatment, almost half designate
international law only as a floor, implying
that fair and equitable treatment may re-
quire more, but never less, than interna-
tional law»7. Moreover, «bearing in mind
that the international minimum standard
has itself been an issue of controversy
between developed and developing States
for a considerable period, it is unlikely that
a majority of States would have accepted
the idea that this standard is fully reflected
in the fair and equitable standard without
clear discussion … both standards may
overlap significantly with respect to issues
such as arbitrary treatment, discrimination
and unreasonableness, but the presence
of a provision assuring fair and equitable
treatment in an investment instrument
does not automatically incorporate the in-
ternational minimum standard for foreign
investors»8.
The true intention of State parties
would have been to accord a higher
level of treatment to the investor.
As a basis for the analysis, it must be
noted that equating the fair and equitable
treatment standard with the international
minimum standard of customary interna-
tional law involves that the standard of
treatment provided by the State parties is
below the one that may be provided if we
consider the standard to be self-contained.
When the Free Trade Commission in Nafta
issued its Interpretative Note, it prohibited
only the most extraordinary forms of gov-
ernment misconduct (a conclusion that
comes from the Neer case, which relies
on egregious, outrageous and shocking
conduct). The latter was an interpretation
for the specific case of Nafta that must
be applied in that context. Nevertheless,
in the general area of investment agree-
ments, it becomes difficult to believe that
considering the evolution in the investment
attraction policy in most States, all those
agreements in which the equating of the
fair and equitable treatment standard with
the international minimum standard is not
7 Coe, Jack J., Fair and Equitable Treatment Under Nafta’s Investment Chapter, American Society of
International Law, Proceedings of the Ninety-Sixth Annual Meeting, March 16, 2002.
8 Vasciannie, Stephen, The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment Law and
Practice, The British Yearbook of International Law, 1999, Oxford, Volume 70 1999 (2000), p. 144.
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expressly stipulated, the intention of the
State parties was to minimize the treat-
ment that must be granted by the host
State in order to commit this most «outra-
geous» conduct. Such was the Pope and
Talbot9 arbitral tribunal’s conclusion, prior
to the Free Trade Commission’s Note,
which although fairly criticized on some
issues, in consideration of the Model BIT
of 1987 of the United States, which af-
forded a higher level of protection to the
investor, expressed a very valid opinion in
the sense that the true intention of the State
parties was to accord a higher level of
treatment to the investor. The latter con-
clusion is even more relevant if we take
into account that through the Most-
Favored Nation Clause included in invest-
ment agreements, the investor may de-
mand this high degree conduct from the
host State, since it is more favorable treat-
ment.
Currently and «More contemporarily,
an ICSID tribunal recently stated that in
order to amount to a violation of [a] BIT
[guarantee of fair and equitable treatment],
any procedural irregularity would have to
amount to bad faith, willful disregard of
due process of law or an extreme insuffi-
ciency of action such that the act in ques-
tion amounted to an arbitrary act that vio-
lates the tribunal’s sense of juridical pro-
priety. While some tribunals might not take
a position quite as extreme, it does appear
that something close to this standard is
generally applied»10. This is an arbitral
award (Alex Genin, Eastern Credit Lim-
ited, Inc. and A.S. Baltoil Genin v. Re-
public of Estonia) based on a self-con-
tained standard. However, as expressly
stated in the treaty, Nafta arbitrators had
to deal with the standard equated to inter-
national minimum standard of treatment
according to customary international law.
States have acknowledged that the inter-
pretation imposed by the Free Trade Com-
mission did not equate fair and equitable
treatment to the customary international
law as defined in the Neer case. In fact, it
referred to what customary international
law meant at this time, i.e., in its evolved
form.
The extent to which customary
international has evolved is debatable.
Did the findings of the arbitrators in
the above case comply with the definition
of this standard as stated by the Free Trade
Commission, or did they exceed it? To
what extent has customary international
law evolved? What is the limit between
customary international law as it has
evolved to this date and a wholly self-con-
tained standard?
In this sense, «while tribunals differ
as to whether they refer to a minimum
9 Pope and Talbot Inc. vs. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL case (Award April 10, 2001) http://
ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/PopeandTalbot-Merit.pdf.
1 0 Gross Stuart G., Inordinate Chill: Bit’s, Non–Nafta MITs, and Host State Regulatory Freedom – An
Indonesian Case Study, Michigan Journal of International Law, Spring 2003. Referring to the Alex
Genin, Eastern Credit Limited, Inc. and A.S. Baltoil Genin vs. Republic of Estonia case.
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international standard, the bulk of the BIT
and NAFTA cases which have dealt with
the issue appear to apply a standard close
to a minimum international standard. In the
situations where a violation was found,
evidence was presented showing bad
faith, discriminatory intent, and/or ultra
vires actions on the part of host-State gov-
ernment officials. In all other instances,
including instances where host-State ac-
tions were not the model of clarity or fair-
ness but which were legally justified and
non-discriminatory, no violation was
found.»11. The latter is a fact, tribunals tend
to apply a standard close to the interna-
tional minimum standard; despite this, many
awards, due to the vagueness of the agree-
ment on the issue, have exceeded it.
Tribunals tend to apply a
standard close to the international
minimun standard.
In the Metalcald case12, the Tribunal
found a violation of article 1105 (1) due to
a lack of transparency in the Mexican le-
gal process. In reviewing the award of the
tribunal, the Supreme Court of British
Columbia considered that «the tribunal has
inaccurately read transparency provisions
of Nafta Chapter 18 into Chapter 11 and
that transparency is not a requirement
under customary international law.»13
Moreover, «it is clear that the Tribu-
nal proceeded on the basis that the scope
of Article 1105 extended beyond norms
that have become an accepted part of
customary international law. This is evi-
dent insofar as its decision does not in-
voke customary international law as the
basis for imposing transparency require-
ments on Mexico; rather, in its view, these
requirements flowed from conventional
international law, namely the NAFTA …
The Tribunal had misstated the applicable
law to include transparency obligations and
it then made its decision on the basis of
the concept of transparency»14.
The Metalcald15, Myers16 and Pope
and Talbot17 awards «proceed on the ba-
sis that a breach of article 1105 can be
found for acts that would not be found to
have breached the minimum standard of
treatment at customary international
law»18.
1 1 Gross Stuart G., op. cit.
1 2 Metalclad Corporation vs. The United Mexican States. ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/97/1. (Award
August 30, 2000). <http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/MetacladAward-English.pdf>.
1 3 Nanda Ved P., Fair and Equitable Treatment Under Nafta’s Investment Chapter, American Society of
International Law, Proceedings of the Ninety–Sixth Annual Meeting, March 16, 2002.
1 4 Tollefson Chris, Metalclad vs. United Mexican States Revisited: Judicial Oversight of Nafta’s Chapter
Eleven Investor–State Claim Process, Minnesota Journal of Global Trade, Summer 2002.
1 5 Metalclad Corporation vs. The United Mexican States.
1 6 S.D. Myers Inc. vs. Canada. UNCITRAL Case (Second Partial Award 21 October 2002). <http://
ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/SDMeyers-secondPartialAward.pdf>.
1 7 Pope and Talbot Inc. vs. Government of Canada.
1 8 Thomas J. C., Fair and Equitable Treatment Under Nafta´s Investment Chapter, American Society of
International Law, Proceedings of the Ninety–Sixth Annual Meeting, March 16, 2002.
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Moreover, in the Maffezini case19,
Spain was held responsible for violating
the treatment clauses in its BIT with Ar-
gentina when it conducted a loan transac-
tion without enough transparency so as to
be fair and equitable to the investor, al-
though the applicable BIT did not refer to
international law; therefore, there was no
discussion of international custom by the
tribunal.
In general, «an analysis of the opin-
ions of the arbitral tribunals, which have
attempted to interpret and apply the ‘fair
and equitable treatment’ standard, identi-
fied a number of elements which, singly
or in combination, they have treated as
encompassed in the definition of the ‘fair
and equitable standard’: due diligence and
due process, including non-denial of jus-
tice and lack of arbitrariness, transparency
and good faith. There is a common un-
derstanding among OECD countries that
due diligence and due process, including
non-denial of justice and lack of arbitrari-
ness, are elements well grounded in cus-
tomary international law which could be
accepted as part of the definition of fair
and equitable treatment. There are differ-
ing views as of the role of transparency
as a new or a possible element of a fair
and equitable standard linked to evolving
customary law. Most OECD countries’
agreements define it as an obligation un-
der a separate provision. OECD countries
seem to consider good faith to be more a
principle underlying the general obligation
rather than a distinct obligation to inves-
tors pursuant to the ’fair and equitable
treatment’ standard»20.
For OECD countries, due diligence
and due process could be accepted as a
part of the definition of fair and
equitable treatment.
In the scope of Nafta, the interpreta-
tion granted by the Free Trade Commis-
sion has not been helpful in clarifying
things. «Now that in the light of the Notes
of Interpretation, a customary international
law standard is to be applied by arbitral
tribunals in interpreting minimum standards
of treatment, how will ’fair and equitable
treatment’ be construed? The basic con-
cepts, of course, are fairness and due proc-
ess, but as article 1105 stands, its language
surely is not a model of clarity. Also, as
we have seen, no consistent body of juris-
prudence has thus far been developed by
arbitral tribunals. As the Metalclad tribu-
nal and the British Columbia court’s deci-
sion diverge in interpreting the pertinent
concepts, there is no certainty as to how
future tribunals will construe the phrase.
No reliance can therefore be placed on
precedent, for the rationale for tribunal
awards is often conflicting and lacks co-
herence»21.
1 9 Emilio Agustín Maffezini vs. The Kingdom of Spain,  ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7. (Award November
13, 2000).
2 0 OECD, Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investmen Law: Draft Concluding
Observations. OECD, September, 2004, p. 3.
2 1 Vid. P. Nanda, op. cit.
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The Free Trade Commission’s inten-
tion, through the issuance of its Notes, was
to restrict the flexibility of arbitral tribu-
nals. However, the international minimum
standard’s own vagueness as a term did
not allow even that, since Tribunals have
in practice exceeded its intentional terms.
The whole divergence between most
tribunals’ decisions seems to confirm that
the term is still subject to their own inter-
pretations according to the facts of each
case. To many, it seems that tribunals
should maintain the opportunity to construe
their text. Relying on the principle behind
the investment agreement, which is to
grant protection to the foreign investor, the
restriction of the standard’s meaning to
customary international law and, therefore,
the restriction of the tribunals’ own func-
tions, does not help in this respect. «Inter-
pretation must begin with the rules that
appear in the Vienna Convention, but it
cannot end with the Notes of Interpreta-
tion»22.
The meaning of the fair and equitable
treatment standard is still mainly in
the hands of each tribunal.
In conclusion, although some invest-
ment agreements do equate the fair and
equitable treatment to the international
minimum standard in customary interna-
tional law, it cannot be concluded that this
is the general meaning that the standard
has adopted in international law. Even
Nafta tribunals’ that were restricted in
their interpretation exceeded customary
international law, which leads us to con-
clude that the meaning is still mainly in the
hands of each tribunal, eventually apply-
ing a plain-meaning approach to it.
A SELF CONTAINED STANDARD?
The fair and equitable treatment
standard conceived as a self-contained
standard relies on the idea that the stand-
ard of treatment is given its plain mean-
ing, that is, each word contained in the
standard must be analyzed on the basis of
its own general definition. Therefore, the
assessment to be carried out to determine
the content of the standard which will be
afforded to the foreign investor is based
on the proper meaning of the terms «fair»
and «equitable». Still, this is only the basis
on which the determination will be made.
Other elements will be taken into account,
most importantly, the facts and special
features of the case. This plain meaning
approach is concordant with the canons
of interpretation of treaties surrendered by
international law. It is «no doubt entirely
consistent with canons of interpretation in
international law»23.
A treatment will thus be Fair «when it
is free from bias, fraud or injustice; equi-
table, legitimate… not taking undue ad-
vantage; disposed to concede every rea-
2 2 Brower, Charles H., Fair and Equitable Treatmen Under Nafta’s Investment Chapter. American
Society of International Law. Proceedings of the Ninety-Six Annual Meeting, March 16, 2002.
2 3 Vasciannie Stephen, p. 103.
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sonable claim»; and by the same token,
equitable treatment is that which is char-
acterized by equity or fairness … fair, just,
reasonable»24.
An important ruling concerning this
theory was issued in the Pope and Talbot
case, which established that the fairness
element in article 1105 is additive to the
requirements of international law. The lat-
ter conclusion was not based on the word-
ing of article 1105 since the Tribunal rec-
ognized that such article suggested other-
wise, but the interpretation was tackled
on the basis of the consideration of BITs
signed by the United States both before
and after Nafta, which granted a higher
standard of treatment to the investor.
On the other hand, the Pope and
Talbot case considered that if we take into
account the most-favored nation clause,
it becomes absurd to deny an investor the
better treatment granted in other invest-
ment agreements, considering that through
this clause, the investor will have access
to this improved treatment. The Pope and
Talbot Tribunal considered that the stand-
ard set by Nafta was equal to that granted
by BITS that preceded Nafta. The Tribu-
nal did not approve the idea that the inten-
tion of the parties would have been to deny
the investors under Nafta the better treat-
ment existent under BITs.
The plain-meaning approach entails a
series of advantages, such as «the con-
siderable advantages of uniformity». Af-
ter all, why should «fair and equitable treat-
ment» mean something different depend-
ing on which BIT applies?25. This is not a
minor issue. It seems that this approach
would surely improve the uniformity of the
interpretation of the standard issued by
arbitral Tribunals. If we consider the stand-
ard in its plain meaning, arbitral rulings
would become more uniform and may only
vary in a little degree according to the facts
of each case. It seems much easier to rely
on the general meaning granted to a word
than to determine what special standards
of customary international law are equiva-
lent to the fair and equitable treatment
standard. The decision, considering the
case’s facts, must simply be based on
whether the conduct at issue is fair and
equitable or unfair and inequitable.
It is easier to rely on the
general meaning of a word than to
determine which standards of
customary international law are
equivalent to that of the fair and
equitable treatment.
Another approach to the issue is the
view of F. A. Mann26, who considered that
the obligation of fair and equitable treat-
ment constitutes the overriding obligation.
2 4 Idem.
2 5 Coe Jack C.
2 6 F.A. Mann, British Treaties for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 52 British Yearbook
of International Law, 1981. In Stuart G. Gross: Inordinate Chill: Bit’s, Non–Nafta MITs, and Host
State Regulatory Freedom – An Indonesian Case Study. Michigan Journal of International Law,
Spring 2003.
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This overriding obligation includes other
standards, such as the most-favored na-
tion clause and national treatment stand-
ards. In his view, these standards are
granted to ensure that the fair and equita-
ble treatment standard is not impeded.
However, the latter is a minority position.
Generally, the most-favored nation and
national treatment standards are independ-
ent of the fair and equitable treatment
standard.
A tribunal would not be
concerned with a minimun,
maximun or average standard.
Notwhistanding the latter, Mann states
that «it is misleading to equate the fair and
equitable standard with the international
minimum standard: this is because the
terms ‘fair and equitable treatment’ en-
visage conduct that goes far beyond the
minimum standard and afford protection
to a greater extent and according to a much
more objective standard than any previ-
ously employed form of words. A tribunal
would not be concerned with a minimum,
maximum or average standard. It will have
to decide whether in all circumstances the
conduct in issue is fair and equitable or
unfair and inequitable. No standard defined
by other words is likely to be material. The
terms are to be understood and applied
independently and autonomously»27.
However, to others, «fair and equita-
ble treatment is not to be assessed accord-
ing to customary international law, but
rather represents an expanded, contem-
porary understanding of customary inter-
national law»28.
If we analyze the facts, we will ap-
preciate that even those arbitral rulings that
based their findings on an investment
agreement that equates the standard wiht
the international minimum standard clearly
exceeded the terms of that investment
agreement, granting the standard a mean-
ing that is beyond the international mini-
mum standard as acknowledged at this
time. It seems that Tribunals are more
confident in making use of the rules of in-
terpretation of international law and de-
fine the standard in consideration of the
treaty’s objectives and the facts of the
case. In conclusion, they have applied the
theory of the fair and equitable treatment
standard as a self-contained standard. The
reason for this is that most investment
agreements, as stated in the preceding
Chapter, do not make the fair and equita-
ble treatment standard interchangeable
with the international minimum standard
while in those that do, there is no equating
it with the international minimum stand-
ard of customary international law (with
some exceptions).
An important view is that of Rudolf
Dolzer and Magrete Stevens, who say that
«the fact that parties to BITS have con-
2 7 OECD, Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment Law, p. 23.
2 8 Foy Patrick G. and Robert J.C. Deane, Foreign Investment Protection under Investment Treaties:
Recent developments under Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement. ICSID review
– Foreign Investment Law Journal, Volume 16, Number 2, Fall 2001. In OECD, Fair and Equitable
Treatment Standard in International Investment Law, p. 23.
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sidered it necessary to stipulate this stand-
ard as an express obligation rather than
rely on a reference to international law
and thereby invoke a relatively vague con-
cept such as the minimum standard is
probably evidence of a self-contained
standard. Further, some treaties refer to
international law in addition to the fair and
equitable treatment, thus appearing to re-
affirm that international law standards are
consistent with, but complementary to, the
provision of the BIT»29.
In some circumstances, States and
foreign investors view lack of
precision as a virtue.
The consideration of this theory is
nevertheless not without difficulties. A
plain-meaning approach may become sub-
jective and lack precision. However, «in
some circumstances, both the States and
the foreign investors may view lack of
precision as a virtue, for it promotes flex-
ibility in the investment process». There-
fore, it seems that many existent arbitral
rulings have headed towards this self-con-
tained standard theory anyway. It might
require some extra arbitral rulings to to-
tally define the meaning’s standard on the
basis of the theory’s elements. Professor
P. Julliard refers to this: «… the interpre-
tation of the fair and equitable treatment,
an imprecise notion –‘notion aux contours
imprécis’– will be progressively developed
through the ‘praetorian’ work of the
arbitral tribunals.»
Notwithstanding all the latter, when
defining the meaning of the fair and equi-
table treatment standard, arbitral tribunals
must take into account the real intention
of parties when signing an investment
agreement, which is to grant reliable pro-
tection to the foreign investor to stimulate
investment in their territory. This will cer-
tainly avoid equating it to the international
minimum standard, which takes away a
real and efficient protection.
Professor Muchlinski states that: «The
concept of fair and equitable treatment is
not precisely defined. It offers a general
point of departure in formulating an argu-
ment that the foreign investor has not been
well treated by reason of discriminatory
or other unfair measures being taken
against its interests. It is, therefore, a con-
cept that depends on the interpretation of
specific facts for its content. At most, it
can be said that the concept connotes the
principle of non–discrimination and pro-
portionality in the treatment of foreign in-
vestors»30.
It must be concluded that the fair and
equitable treatment standard still remains
a vague and undetermined concept that
needs further developing by arbitral tribu-
nals. The point, however, is to determine
the starting point on the basis of which
these arbitral tribunals must rule in the
2 9 Dolzer Rudolf and Magrete Stevens. In OECD Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International
Investment Law, p. 23.
3 0 Muchlinski Peter. Multinational Enterprises and the Law. 1995, p. 625. In Fair and Equitable Treatment
Standard in International Investment Law. OECD, September, 2004, p. 24.
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future. Will we accept the rules of inter-
pretation of international law and decide
based on facts, considering the best pro-
tection to be granted to the foreign inves-
tor, or will we limit its delimitation to a
standard, such as the international mini-
mum, that grants a very basic protection
to the investor which already exists in cus-
tomary international law? Unless the
agreement specifically orders the arbitral
Tribunal to equate the standard with the
international minimum standard, the an-
swer is a self-contained standard ap-
proach. It seems that the current evolu-
tion in the investment area regarding the
protection of foreign investors provides a
clear statement: For the sake of the liber-
alization of investments, investor protec-
tion must not regress. This is the intention
behind investment agreements, and the
interpretation of all standards established
therein (including the fair and equitable
treatment standard) must be oriented in
that direction.
Investor protection must not regress.
CONCLUSIONS
The fair and equitable treatment
standard, present in international invest-
ment law, has gained importance as a
mechanism against unfair and unequal
behavior of host States against foreign in-
vestors. It has arisen as a fundamental
response to a new type of expropriation
(different from the traditional direct and
creeping types of expropriation) that could
be enacted against the investor.
This new type of expropriation amo-
unts to a behavior of the host State that
does not involve a physical taking of prop-
erty (direct expropriation) or conduct that
makes it impossible to make proper use of
the property (creeping expropriation). It
consists of a certain treatment by the host
State that would eventually impair the in-
vestor’s ability to develop the investment,
thus affecting his property rights in regard
thereto. For example, a lack of transpar-
ency by the host State which does not al-
low the investor to learn of all regulations
that must be complied with, resulting in the
above-mentioned impairment.
The fair and equitable treatment
standard is often invoked by foreign in-
vestors before arbitral tribunals, who claim
that although they are not affected by the
traditional forms of expropriation, they are
incapable of developing their investment
due to a host State’s conduct that does
not allow it.
The main conflict in relation to this
standard is the vagueness in which it is
conceived. Views issued by scholars and
arbitrators, as well as the expression of
what is contained in investment agree-
ments, demonstrate that there is no uni-
formity in the matter, a situation that is
present to a greater degree in various
cases that have dealt with the issue of
determining its true meaning.
The OECD31 states in this regard that
3 1 OECD, Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment Law: Draft Concluding
Observations, p. 2.
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«because of the differences in its formu-
lation, the proper interpretation of the ’fair
and equitable treatment standard’ is influ-
enced by the specific wording of the par-
ticular treaty, its context, negotiating his-
tory or other indications of the party’s in-
tent».
There is consensus as to the defining
elements of the minimun standard in
customary international law.
Some investment treaties specifically
link the standard with the minimum stand-
ard of customary international law. If this
were the case, there is no doubt that this
will be the interpretation to assign to the
standard. However, in the case of other
agreements, which constitute the major-
ity, no such link is made, implying that the
standard may be considered to signify a
lot more than the minimum standard of
customary international law. There is a
common consensus as to what the defin-
ing elements are in the minimum standard
of customary international law (which, by
the way, evolves continuously). Neverthe-
less, whenever there is no express equat-
ing with the minimum standard, there is
no general agreement as to what may we
consider the «Fair and Equitable Treat-
ment» standard to mean.
In consequence, and although we must
await further rulings by arbitral tribunals
to better shape the standard, we must as-
sume that thus far to date, the majority of
investment agreements do not equate the
standard with the minimum standard of
customary international law, and, therefore,
are not bound by that interpretation.
Moreover, arbitral rulings have exceeded
in their interpretation the general elements
that constitute that minimum standard of
customary international law (for example,
reference to transparency), which leads
us to believe that they had the intention of
elevating the level of protection to the for-
eign investor and not limiting it to custom-
ary international law.
Although investment agreements that
equate the standard with the international
minimum standard are obliged to make that
interpretation, and the fact that there are
some arbitral rulings that establish that
nexus, these sparse cases do not suffice
to transform that interpretation into the
general approach to the meaning of the
standard. We must take into account in-
ternational rules of interpretation, the in-
tent of the parties, all of which leads us to
realize that a plain-meaning approach
must be applied. In relation to the stand-
ard’s meaning, «il suo contenuto non
sembrerebbe essere determinabile in
maniera assoluta e definitiva, essendo esso
un principio astratto e relativo; il
trattamento giusto ed equo assume però
un significato concreto quando é inserito
in un contesto giuridico particolare.»32
It is true, there is a general concern
that this approach may not help in dealing
with the arbitrariness that may appear
when there is no direct guidance for arbi-
3 2 María Rosaria Mauro, Gli accordi bilaterali sulla promozione e la protezione degli investimenti. G.
Giappichelli Editore, Torino, p 193.
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trators. However, this is a view that will
be readily corrected through jurisprudence,
which has so far established some recur-
rent elements that are a part of the stand-
ard, such as due diligence, due process,
non-denial of justice and transparency.
When signing an agreement, the
real intention of parties is generally
to grant the best protection to the
investor.
The real intention of the parties when
signing an investment agreement is, in most
cases, to grant the best protection to the
investor, allowing the free-flow of invest-
ment into its territory. The most important
benefit of a plain-meaning approach is that
it allows the standard to be interpreted
according to that real intention of the par-
ties. In other words, it grants the best pro-
tection to the investor, which implies the
fairest and most equitable conduct by the
host State with regard to the specific facts
of the case. Equating the standard with
the minimum standard of customary in-
ternational law is lowering the protection
to the most basic elements of customary
international law. «In tal senso esso
potrebbe essere inteso come il principio di
buona fede del diritto interno, per cui
l`obbligo di concedere un trattamento
giusto ed equo imporrebbe alle Parti di
tenere un comportamento conforme agli
obiettivi dell’ accordo e quindi, alle Parti
contraenti dei BIT’s un comportamento
che non ostacoli la promozione e la
protezione degli investimienti stranieri»33.
In consequence, the aim of protecting for-
eign investment is the fundamental issue
to be taken into account in the interpreta-
tion of the standard. Moreover, «It is in a
more general way a functional minimum
standard of treatment of private business,
quite different, however, from the tradi-
tionally known legal minimum standard of
the so-called civilized nations»34.
Finally, whatever the evolution of the
growing jurisprudence of investor-state
Tribunals called upon to explore the mean-
ing of fair and equitable treatment may
be, other questions in regard to the stand-
ard will surely arise. For example, what
will be the criteria to determine the com-
pensation to be granted to the affected
investor in the event a violation of the
standard is detected? Can we apply the
elements that arbitrators use to determine
the compensation for a direct expropria-
tion (Hull Formula)? Can we equate the
violation of the fair and equitable treat-
ment standard with a direct type of ex-
propriation and, therefore, apply fair mar-
ket value criteria in order to compensate
the affected investor?
In this sense, the Chilean model of
BIT35 establishes that where the market
3 3 Mauro María Rosaria, p. 191.
3 4 Preiswerk, New Developments in Bilateral Investment Protection. In María Rosaria Mauro, p. 191.
3 5 Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Chile and the Government on the Reciprocal
Promotion and Protection of Investments, reprinted in UNCTAD, International Investment
Compendium, Volume III, p. 143 – 50. In Stephen Vasciannie, p. 149.
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value or property compensation cannot be
ascertained, compensation may be deter-
mined in accordance with «generally rec-
ognized equitable principles of valuation,
taking certain factors into account.» Al-
though this is certainly not a clear rule, at
least it is dealt with. But what are the cri-
teria when there is no conventional or
treaty guidance? The issue becomes even
more problematic if we consider that de-
veloping and developed countries have a
different perspective as to whether the
Hull formula must be applied.
In the case of MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd.
and MTD Chile S.A. vs. Republic of
Chile36, in which the only argument by
which the State of Chile was charged was
a violation of the fair and equitable treat-
ment standard, the Tribunal recognized that
the BIT between Malaysia and Chile does
not establish the equivalent to the criteria
of prompt, adequate and effective com-
pensation for expropriation in the case of
breaches of the BIT on other grounds. In
this case, the parties agreed to apply the
criteria of the Chorzow Factory case ruled
by the Permanent Court of Justice that
states «that compensation should wipe out
all consequences of the illegal act and re-
establish the situation which would, in all
probability, have existed if that had not
been committed»37.
Although this is a reasonable and just
criterion, could it be applied in those claims
in which there is no agreement between
the parties and no reference is made to it
by the investment agreement? Could the
term «adequate» compensation in the Hull
Formula amount to wiping out all conse-
quences of the illegal act? Moreover, does
the fair market value apply or not?
In the Marvin Feldman vs. Mexico
case, the Tribunal acknowledged that
«Nafta does not provide further guidance
as to the proper measure of damages or
compensation for situations that do not fall
under article 1101 (expropriation); the only
detailed measure of damages specifically
provided in Chapter 11 is in article 1101
(2-3) ‘fair market value’, which necessar-
ily applies only to situations that fall within
that Article 1101»38. Considering that there
is no criteria to adhere to, the tribunal fi-
nally determined damages on a discretion-
ary basis.
Finally, in relation to the amount of com-
pensation to be granted to an investor that
has suffered a violation of the Fair and
Equitable Treatment standard, a discussion
will certainly arise in regard to the possibil-
ity that the compensation be calculated in
regard to the fair market value of the whole
investment, considering that such a viola-
tion made it impossible for the investor to
develop his investment, which, in practice,
is equivalent to confiscating property.
3 6 MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. and MTD Chile S.A. v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case Nº ARB/01/7 (Award,
May 25, 2004). <http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/MTD-Award_000.pdf>.
3 7 Case concerning the Chorzòw Factory. <http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/decisions/
1927.07.26_chorzow/>.
3 8 Marvin Feldman vs. Mexico. ICSID Case No. ARB (AF) /99/1. (Award December 16, 2002). <http:/
/ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/feldman_mexico-award-english>.
